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 Introduction
If I  had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. 
Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what 
it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it 
wouldn’t be, it would. You see?
—Alice in Wonderland
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sat in the East Room of the 
White House. With Martin Luther King Jr. standing behind him, President 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. President Johnson 
proclaimed that the Act would “eliminate the last vestiges of injustice in 
our beloved country.”1
This historic law prohibited discrimination in a wide range of American 
life, including at the ballot box, in restaurants, and in hotels. Title VII of 
that law prohibited discrimination in the American workplace. For the 
first time in the United States, it became unlawful for many employers 
to discriminate against workers because of their race, sex, religion, color, 
and national origin.2 Congress later passed laws making age and disability 
discrimination illegal.
This book shows how federal judges approach discrimination cases 
brought by workers who are protected under these laws. Over time, 
judges have created dozens of frameworks, rules, and inferences to help 
them analyze discrimination cases. But all of these frameworks, rules, and 
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inferences do not help judges determine whether discrimination actually 
happened.
Instead, this analysis has created an alternative reality. Here, no dis-
crimination happens when a supervisor gropes a woman’s breast, so long 
as the supervisor only does it one or two times. In this world of federal 
discrimination law, some judges declare it is legal and not discriminatory 
for an employer to give a worker a negative evaluation based on the color 
of her skin. This is not discrimination. In this alternative universe, when 
a supervisor calls a woman a “cunt,” a “whore,” and a “bitch,” this is not 
evidence that the supervisor is biased. When a supervisor says, “all blacks 
are lazy” or uses vile racial epithets, this is not evidence of racism. These 
are simply stray remarks that the judge can disregard. The book tells the 
stories of workers and how courts dismissed their claims.
1. RACHEL, TINA, ANTHONY, AND JOHN
To introduce you to this world of discrimination law, we start with three 
stories based on cases in the U.S. federal courts.
Rachel is black. Her supervisor, Bill, is white. Bill accidentally copies 
Rachel on an email in which he states he will never give a black employee 
a positive evaluation. Later, Bill gives Rachel a negative evaluation. Is it 
possible that Bill’s conduct is discrimination? According to one federal 
appellate court, the answer is no.3 The negative evaluation does not count 
as discrimination.
Tina is a cashier. Tina sued her employer for sexual harassment. In her 
suit, she presented evidence that her supervisor asked her out on dates 
many times, even offering “financial assistance” if she would agree.4 He
once “removed from his pants a large bottle of wine, offered Plaintiff a 
drink, and then asked her to join him later at a local hotel where they 
could have a ‘good time.’ ” She also claimed that on at least two occasions, 
he touched her breasts and touched her buttocks once. The court dis-
missed Tina’s claim, ruling that what happened to Tina was not sexual 
harassment.
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Anthony and John are African American men. They both sought pro-
motions at a company to become shift managers. Neither received a pro-
motion.5 Instead, the white plant manager promoted two white men. The 
plant manager admitted that he had not followed the written qualifications 
for the shift manager job when he made the decisions about whom to pro-
mote.6 Moreover, Anthony and John provided evidence that the manager 
referred to them as “boy.” They also had evidence, though disputed by the 
employer, that they were better qualified than the white employees who 
were selected for the promotions.7 They also submitted evidence that no 
black worker had ever been promoted to the shift manager position that 
they had sought.8
Though jury trials are rare, Anthony’s and John’s cases made it to a jury. 
The jury found the employer discriminated against Anthony and John 
based on their race. Despite this verdict, the judge who presided in the 
case decided there was insufficient evidence of discrimination and dis-
missed the cases, finding for the employer. The judge noted that using the 
term “boy” when referring to Anthony and John was not “probative of 
racial animus.”9
The appellate court that reviewed the case agreed with the trial court on 
a number of matters. Calling African American men “boy” was not evi-
dence of racial discrimination, and the jury was wrong when it found dis-
crimination in Anthony’s case. However, the appeals court ordered a new 
trial for John, finding that John had more evidence to support his case.10
In these cases, the courts made a decision: what happened to Rachel, 
Tina, and Anthony was not discrimination. In cases like Rachel’s and 
Tina’s, the judges were so sure of the correct outcome that they were will-
ing to dismiss the cases before they ever reached juries. In Anthony’s case, 
the judges felt comfortable ignoring a jury’s verdict. According to these 
judges, there was only one right answer in each case: the employer had not 
discriminated against the employees. The worker should lose the case and 
the employer should win. These are not isolated cases. Searches of federal 
cases reveal case after case with similar results, where judges dismiss cases 
brought by workers who allege they are subject to racial epithets or when 
workers have evidence, for example, that that their supervisors thought 
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they were too old to do their jobs.11 Courts dismiss cases when women 
allege that their boss or their coworkers repeatedly touched their breasts 
or buttocks, where supervisors repeatedly asked them out on dates or for 
sexual favors, or where they were repeatedly the victim of unwanted sexu-
alized comments and gestures.12
The results of these cases are surprising, especially when you consider 
the traditional rules of litigation. Under these norms, judges decide legal 
issues, and when there is a dispute about facts, the jury decides. Federal 
judges are not supposed to pick winners and losers in cases where the 
facts are contested. If a case presents facts suggesting discrimination, a 
jury should decide the outcome. If a case is a close call, it is supposed to 
go to a jury.
As you will see, federal judges do not apply the traditional rules of 
litigation to discrimination cases. Instead, judges have created a new set 
of rules. These rules are not neutral. They favor employers and disfavor 
workers.
Judges have constructed a complex system of legal frameworks, doc-
trines, and evidentiary rules that allow them to dismiss claims before trial. 
Even when a case makes it to trial, and a jury finds that discrimination has 
occurred, trial court and appellate judges use these same legal frameworks 
to overturn the jury’s verdict. In fact, discrimination cases are some of the 
most disfavored cases on the federal docket. Judges dismiss these claims at 
rates far higher than most other kinds of claims.
This book shows how the methods that courts use to evaluate discrimi-
nation cases are flawed. These methods do not reliably allow courts to 
determine whether discrimination occurred in a particular case. Instead, 
the procedures courts use allow them to declare that no discrimination 
happened, even when the worker has evidence that her race, her sex, or 
other protected trait caused her to lose her job or otherwise negatively 
affected her position.
We start from a simple premise. When a worker presents evidence that 
he or she faced a negative consequence because of his or her race, sex, or 
other protected trait, a jury should hear the case, consider the contested 
evidence, and decide whether discrimination occurred.13 At a jury trial, 
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the employee (plaintiff) can put forward evidence to convince the jury 
that the employer discriminated. The employer (defendant) can challenge 
the worker’s evidence and try to convince the jury that the plaintiff has 
not presented sufficient evidence of discrimination and has not proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was discriminated against.
The stories in this book show that judges have narrowed the defi-
nition of discrimination. When a male supervisor touches a woman’s 
breast and buttocks, the supervisor may have engaged in a form of 
discrimination more precisely referred to as sexual harassment. When 
a supervisor calls black men “boy,” race discrimination might have 
occurred. When a supervisor says that he would never give workers 
of certain religions good evaluations and then gives them bad evalu-
ations, that might be religious discrimination. In each of these cases, 
a jury could determine that race, sex, or religion negatively affected 
the worker’s job. This book shows why judges should not dismiss these 
cases before or after a jury trial.
2.  THE SUPER- STATUTE
There are three federal laws that serve as the cornerstone protections 
against employment discrimination— Title VII, the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Congress passed Title VII in 1964. Title VII prohibits employers from 
discriminating against workers based on race, sex, color, national ori-
gin, and religion. It has had a profound impact in reshaping workplace 
norms and opportunities. Title VII is so important that scholars William 
Eskridge and John Ferejohn labeled it a “super- statute.”14 To attain super- 
statute status, the law must embrace a great principle. For Title VII, that 
principle is combatting employment discrimination.
When Congress deliberated about Title VII, a question arose about 
whether age should also be a protected class. Although Congress was 
not ready to add age as a protected category in 1964, it did so three years 
later when it passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 
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The ADEA protects workers 40 years old and older from age discrimina-
tion. Several years later, in 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, which expanded discrimination law to cover people with 
disabilities. Workers can also file claims for race discrimination under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981.
Taken together, these laws are supposed to provide a level playing field 
for workers in these protected categories, and they have had some positive 
effect in limiting workplace discrimination. In the past, companies had 
policies that segregated workers. Black employees could hold only certain 
jobs— often the jobs that paid less.15 Some companies also had policies that 
required women to quit their jobs when they married or became preg-
nant.16 State laws prohibited women from working at night.17 Thanks in 
part to the passage of these laws, all of these actions are now illegal.
3.  THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, there were new 
discussions about America’s progress toward equality including entering a 
new post- racial era. In this allegedly post- racial era, Americans have tran-
scended the legacy of race discrimination. Similarly, many people believe 
that other types of discrimination are rare and only happen at the hands 
of a few bad actors.
The American workplace is far less equal than many people would like 
to believe.18 One study by Professor Devah Pager19 shows the magnitude 
of the inequality. Professor Pager sent out white and black testers to apply 
for jobs. During the application process, some of the applicants indicated 
they had no criminal history while others suggested that they did have 
a criminal record. Professor Pager’s study found that white applicants 
without criminal records received callback interviews for jobs 34 percent 
of the time20 while black applicants without criminal records received 
callback interviews only 14 percent of the time.21 White applicants with 
criminal records received callback interviews 17 percent of the time22 
while black applicants with criminal records received callback interviews 
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only 5 percent of the time.23 So white men with criminal records actually 
received more callbacks than African American men without a criminal 
record.24
Race matters in hiring. Depending on the study, white applicants were 
“anywhere from 1.5 to 5 times more likely to receive a callback or job offer 
relative to equally qualified black applicants.”25 Over time, the unemploy-
ment rate for African American workers, which may be affected by these 
racialized hiring practices, has typically been about twice the rate of white 
Americans.26
Women and people of color are underrepresented in many jobs in cer-
tain industries and in certain positions of power. In 2015, CNN reported 
that there were only five black CEOs among America’s 500 largest compa-
nies.27 When Microsoft promoted Satya Nadella to CEO in 2014, Fortune 
declared that he was “one minority exec in a sea of white.”28
Women are also underrepresented. The New  York Times reported 
in 2015 that “[f] ewer large companies are run by women than by men 
named John … .”29 In 2014, the New York Times reported that seven out 
of ten people working at Google were men.30 At Google, three out of 
thirty- six of its top- ranking executives were women, and 83 percent of 
its engineers were men.31 Similar numbers were reported at other large 
tech companies.32 Additionally, women hold fewer than 20 percent of the 
board member seats at companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Index.33
In the legal system, people of color and women are similarly under-
represented. In 2015, only about 2 percent of partners at large firms were 
Hispanic or Latino, and about the same number were African American.34 
In some states, fewer than 3 percent of state judges are persons of color.35 
Women are also underrepresented. Since the late 1980s, even though 
women make up anywhere from 40 to 50  percent of American law 
school graduates, fewer than 20 percent of equity partners at law firms 
are women.36 Only 21 percent of leaders in corporate legal departments at 
Fortune 500 companies are women.37 Almost 80 percent of the deans of 
American law schools are men.38 Only 24 percent of federal judges39 and 
27 percent of state court judges are women.40
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Race and sex also affect pay. In 2014, women who worked full- time earned 
about 82 percent of what men earned.41 These numbers become worse when 
the worker is a woman of color. For example, Hispanic women’s median 
salaries in 2014 were only 61.2 percent of white men’s median salaries.42
There is debate about how much of the wage gap is due to factors other 
than discrimination, such as hours worked and career choice. There is 
also discussion about the actual size of the sex- based wage differential. No 
matter how you parse the data, there is an unexplained wage gap between 
women and men.43 For example, one study took into account students’ 
“college major, occupation, economic sector, hours worked, months 
unemployed since graduation, GPA, type of undergraduate institution, 
institution selectivity, age, geographical region, and marital status.”44 The 
study found a 7 percent difference in the earnings of male and female col-
lege graduates one year after graduation that was not explained by any of 
these factors.45 The study further found that ten years after graduation, 
this unexplained wage gap widens to 12 percent.
It is difficult to determine how much bias contributes to these continu-
ing disparities. Other factors, such as class, access to quality education, and 
societal expectations related to career choice, likely play roles. Nonetheless, 
the previously mentioned studies show that these factors do not completely 
explain why there is still so much inequality in American workplaces.
Despite these studies, there is an emerging story about the role that 
bias plays in this continuing inequality. Under the new conventional wis-
dom, “old school” race and sex discrimination is rare. A few bad actors 
may intentionally discriminate against workers, but companies work hard 
to ferret out these bad apples. Writing in 2001, Professor Michael Selmi 
noted: “It seems that the general consensus today is that the role discrimi-
nation plays in contemporary America has been sharply diminished.”46 
The New York Times quoted a tech executive as saying: “This is a pretty 
genteel environment, and you don’t usually see outright manifestations 
of bias… . Occasionally you’ll have some idiot do something stupid and 
hurtful, and I like to fire those people.”47
According to the popular narrative, courts provide robust protections 
against discrimination in cases alleging traditional discrimination. Within 
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the small group of traditional cases that still exist, so the story goes, the 
legal system does a good job of adjudicating these cases. Judges police 
egregious forms of discrimination48 and separate the plausible cases from 
the meritless ones.49 In these traditional cases, judges are largely correct 
in deciding which cases should proceed to juries.50 The cases judges dis-
miss are cases that a litigant would never win. Under this narrative, federal 
judges are committed to combating traditional discrimination. This judi-
cial commitment is strong, and courts will not interfere with protecting 
the core anti- discrimination law.51
So, how does bias continue to affect the workplace? In the new narra-
tive, workplace inequity continues to exist because of complex phenomena. 
Scholars have argued that workplace culture and unconscious bias cause 
race and sex discrimination.52 As Professor Tristin Green writes:  “Race, 
sex, and other protected group characteristics will continue to factor into 
employment decisions, but the decisions are more likely to be driven by 
unconscious biases and stereotypes operating within a facilitating organi-
zational context than by conscious animus operating in isolation.”53 Legal 
scholar Amy Wax has noted: “Some commentators have gone so far as to 
suggest that, as overt bigotry has waned in response to antidiscrimination 
laws and evolving social mores, unintentional or ‘unconscious’ discrimina-
tion has become the most pervasive and important form of bias operating 
in society today.”54
Unconscious biases reinforce inequality: these are the “hidden, reflexive 
preferences that shape most people’s worldviews, and that can profoundly 
affect how welcoming and open a workplace is to different people and 
ideas.”55 A supervisor may believe he acts in a neutral way, though he may 
unconsciously be affected by societal stereotypes about race, sex, or age.56
Commentator Nicholas Kristof has discussed the “biased brain,” 
arguing that we can better understand the roots of racial division in 
America by understanding this unconscious bias.57 Fortune magazine 
has reported: “Equality is a worthy goal— but it’s tough to achieve when 
unconscious bias so pervades the American workplace.”58 Large com-
panies like Google have responded by embracing diversity training that 
focuses on identifying unconscious biases.
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According to the popular narrative, courts handle traditional discrimina-
tion claims well, but they are struggling with more complex ideas like uncon-
scious bias. Courts restrict the law where discrimination is not evident. 
Courts may not be able to adeptly fix problems such as unconscious bias, 
and it may not even be a good idea to hold employers liable for unconscious 
bias.59 Legal scholar Amy Wax has been skeptical of efforts to use the legal 
system to this end, arguing that there are “no known methods for effectively 
controlling unconscious bias in the workplace” and that courts would not be 
particularly good at determining whether workplace decisions resulted from 
the “intermittent, subtle, and elusive phenomenon” of unconscious bias.60
Under this narrative, there is little or nothing left for courts to enforce 
because judges either cannot fix the problems of unconscious bias or 
would be bad at fixing them. If judges are dismissing lawsuits, these cases 
are likely newer kinds of discrimination about which judges feel less com-
fortable and for which there is no overt evidence that race, sex, or other 
protected traits directly played a role in an employment decision.
We contest this narrative. In this book, we will show that the federal 
judiciary often fails to decide traditional discrimination cases in a fair 
manner. Judges have created a whole host of frameworks, inferences, and 
doctrines that they use to dismiss cases and keep them away from juries, 
including cases that present evidence of discrimination.
Modern workplace inequality may very well be caused, in part, by 
unconscious bias, but this is not all that is happening. Judges do not pro-
tect the core of the discrimination statutes. When workers present evi-
dence of traditional discrimination, judges often dismiss their cases.
4.  INTERNAL LIMITS
There is another popular myth about American discrimination law. It is 
easy to win a discrimination lawsuit and also easy to win a very large ver-
dict against an employer. The reality is much different. Congress placed 
specific limits in the federal discrimination statutes that are different in 
kind or degree from almost any other type of claim, outside of claims made 
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by prisoners. The discrimination laws on the books, the ones created by 
Congress, already contain important limits that balance the interests of 
workers, employers, and the courts. When the courts add on doctrines 
and rules to restrict claims, they limit an already narrow cause of action.
Congress limits employment discrimination claims in three important 
ways. First, a person alleging discrimination may not immediately go to 
court and file a claim. Instead, the person must present her claim to either 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a similar 
state agency. This requirement— to file first with an administrative agency 
before going to court— is an additional legal requirement. When a person 
has almost any other kind of claim, he can simply go to court and present 
his grievance.
The EEOC is a federal agency charged with enforcing many federal civil 
rights laws. A person alleging discrimination submits a document to the 
agency called a Charge of Discrimination. The Charge generally describes 
the worker’s allegations against the employer.
The charge- filing process reduces the number of claims filed in court. 
After a charge is filed, the EEOC or state agency may investigate an 
employee’s claims, possibly eliminating the need for later litigation in the 
courts. The EEOC also provides a voluntary mediation system to help the 
parties try to resolve the underlying claim.
As one court noted: “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to 
Title VII’s statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first oppor-
tunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform 
its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory 
efforts.”61 But the discrimination statutes do not require that the EEOC 
fully investigate every claim or that the EEOC make a decision about the 
merits of each claim. In most of the cases that later go to court, the EEOC 
makes no decision about whether discrimination happened or not. Rather, 
the EEOC most often issues a Notice of Right to Sue letter. This notice sim-
ply declares that the EEOC process is finished, without making any deci-
sion about whether the employer violated the law.
In addition to the requirement that applicants or employees must go 
to the agency first, Congress limits the scope of discrimination law by 
Oxfo
rd U
niver
sity P
ress
12 U N E q UA L
requiring discrimination claims to be filed within a short period of time 
after discrimination happens. A person alleging discrimination must sub-
mit her Charge of Discrimination within 180 days or 300 days of the dis-
criminatory act.62 After the EEOC or state agency issues its Right to Sue 
letter, an employee has 90 days to file a claim in court.63 The time limits 
imposed by the discrimination statutes are short compared to limits for 
other types of claims. By comparison, many states give plaintiffs two or 
three years to file negligence claims.64 And some litigants can wait ten 
years before filing suit.65
Even though the EEOC does not make a determination for most claims 
of whether discrimination occurred, the requirement that a potential liti-
gant go to the EEOC or a state agency within a particular time frame limits 
the reach of discrimination law. If the worker misses any of the adminis-
trative filing deadlines, she usually cannot raise her claim in court. This is 
true even if the worker otherwise has a good discrimination case.
Workers also may lose the right to file their claims forever if they tell 
the EEOC about some of their claims, but not all of them. A worker can 
only file a claim in court that is “reasonably related” to the facts sub-
mitted to the EEOC. For example, a worker may go to the EEOC and 
claim he was terminated because of his race. The worker may not real-
ize that the facts also support a claim for retaliation. If the worker does 
not mention retaliation to the EEOC, he may not be able to later pursue 
that claim in court.66 This requirement to submit all potential claims to 
the EEOC applies even if the worker did not realize he was required to 
do this and even if the worker did not understand the different types of 
legal claims.
Discrimination statutes are also limited in a third important way. 
Congress placed limits on the types and amounts of monetary relief that a 
court can award under the discrimination statutes.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has the most 
restrictive damages. Under the ADEA, a worker can receive the wages and 
benefits she lost as a result of age discrimination. If she proves the age dis-
crimination was willful, she can obtain an additional award of damages, 
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but the ADEA limits the amount of this additional award to the amount 
of backpay.67
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) allow employ-
ees to receive wages and benefits lost due to discrimination. They also 
allow workers to obtain punitive damages, which are only available if 
the employee proves the employer discriminated with malice or reckless 
indifference to the law.68 Additional damages, such as damages for emo-
tional distress, are also available.
Title VII caps the total combined compensatory and punitive damages 
that a plaintiff may recover based on the number of employees employed 
by the defendant.69 The highest cap, which applies to employers with 
more than 500 employees, is $300,000.70 An employer with 100 or fewer 
employees only can be liable for up to $50,000 under the cap. This cap 
does not apply to lost wages and benefits. The damages cap is fixed. It 
is not adjusted upward if the employer engaged in especially egregious 
discrimination. Moreover, the cap has not changed since 1991 when it was 
enacted, and it is not adjusted for inflation.71
Congress also limited discrimination law in other ways. Smaller 
employers are outside the reach of federal discrimination law. Under 
Title VII and the ADA, an employer must have at least fifteen employ-
ees to be liable, while under the ADEA, an employer must have at least 
twenty employees to be liable for age discrimination.72 Additionally, not 
all people who work are covered under the laws. The person bringing a 
discrimination claim must be an individual who falls within the statutory 
protections, such as an employee or former employee.73 Often, federal 
discrimination law does not protect volunteers, independent contractors, 
and other similarly situated people.74 The laws also provide employers 
with various defenses that either eliminate or reduce potential discrimi-
nation liability.75
The book describes how federal courts further limit the reach of dis-
crimination law and why they do it. The judiciary, over time, has created a 
series of complex frameworks to evaluate discrimination cases. Supporting 
these frameworks are a host of judge- made procedural and evidentiary 
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rules. Judges apply these frameworks and rules to evaluate discrimination 
claims. Unfortunately, the analysis does not accurately determine whether 
discrimination happened. In many instances, they actually distract courts 
away from the central question in many discrimination cases: was the 
worker treated differently because of her race, sex, or other trait.
